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The Edge Of Human? The problem with the posthuman as the ‘beyond’. 
 
 
As the debate around human enhancement technologies continues and enters a new phase, more 
and more attention is being paid to whether there is a stage at which the enhanced human 
becomes something else, no longer human as we are.  A common critical refrain serenades the 
fear that we will leave our humanity behind and become something else, something other- usually 
termed ‘posthuman’. Yet, how we should define the ‘posthuman’ remains unclear. 
 
To talk about the ‘posthuman’ as if we have left humanity behind, either in the sense of having 
gone ‘beyond’ human or as a certain set of creatures apart from humanity, is both misleading and 
dangerous. It is misleading because it is a hyper-inflated claim, as I will show, and it is dangerous 
because it encourages the belief that the world is- or will soon become- peopled with different 
classes of being. This may engender if not false, then at least dangerous beliefs about rights, 
duties, and moral status. 
 
It is undeniable that enhancement technologies exist, are used, and will continue to develop; and it 
is idle to claim that we ought avoid them wholesale. Depending upon one’s definition,1 from 
integrated technoscientific interventions like nootropics and bionic prostheses; through external 
technologies, anything from eyeglasses to the smartphone; even down to anthropological 
phenomena such as education and agriculture; it is possible to argue that our lives and lifestyles 
already rely on these enhancements today, and perhaps even that they form the basis of what 
makes us who we are. This being so, it is important that we find a way to reconcile ourselves with 
the beings we may become, since ‘they’ and we are products of the same process. In what 
follows, I will set the basis for an argument that what might make us ‘posthuman’ is in fact that 
which makes us (merely!) ‘human’, amplified perhaps; but the same collection of traits, 
characteristics, and measures of moral value as we have ever aspired to possess as markers of 
our humanity. I will argue that to be ‘posthuman’ is in truth to be more human than human - more 
successful at embodying these traits than we, who consider ourselves the model of humanity, do. 
It is not, as critics may claim, to be beyond, to be something to fear, something fundamentally 
different. 
 
Unfortunately the ‘posthuman’ is, at best, an uncertain proposition. What, exactly, would one be, or 
be like?  
 
 
                                                 
1 An issue I have covered elsewhere in some depth. D.R. Lawrence. To what extent is the use of human enhancements 
defended in international human rights legislation? Medical Law International 2013;13(4):254-278.  
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Posthuman as Beyond 
 
The term is frequently bandied about in the literature. It appears to be used, in general, as 
shorthand for any being beyond those we can currently create or imagine evolving in the 
foreseeable future without our help.  I use the term ‘appears to be’ for a reason, however- no 
author seems to mean quite the same thing by it. Very few commentators choose to elaborate on 
the term to elucidate their intended meaning, instead dropping the term straight into their 
argument, and this frequently seems to lead to an understandable- yet misguided and 
unnecessary- confusion. One of the exceptions to this rule is explored below, but let us briefly 
examine the term itself. 
 
The semantics and etymology of the word are fairly plain- ‘post-’ being transparently derived as a 
prefix from the Latin ‘post’, meaning ‘after’ or ‘behind’, and being defined in English as “after in 
time or order”2. Logic dictates, therefore, that a posthuman would be something which supersedes 
(whether that be replacing or co-existing with) humanity. This notion tends to be present in critical 
literature and commentary on the subject, and as we will see may in fact be the only commonality 
between the many examples of such. 
 
In the absence of explicitly stated philosophically principled reasons for assuming a particular 
account of ‘human’- if the etymology holds true- it is difficult to parse what is meant by that which 
comes after. When it is discussed in academia (and in truth this rule generally applies to fiction 
too), ‘posthuman’ is almost always deployed in a philosophical bioethics context, and this is one in 
which the distinctions between the possible interpretations are highly sensitive. It is consequently 
vital to make clearer what one means by posthuman- a clarification which, as mentioned above, is 
only rarely approached explicitly.  
 
Many commentators hold that that a being with capacities beyond those of a ‘normal’ human is de 
facto not human, an idea championed by the American bioconservative Leon Kass:  
 
the scientific project to master nature could, if we are not careful, lead to our 
dehumanization, via eugenics, drug-induced contentment, and other 
transformations of human nature... Will man remain a creature made in the image 
of God, aspiring to align himself with the divine, or will he become an artifact 
created by man in the image of God-knows-what[?]3 
 
                                                 
2 post-  in C. Soanes & A. Stevenson, eds. Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th edn. revised, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press  2006 p. 1121 
3 Quoted in H. Flaumenhaft. The Career of Leon Kass J Contemp Health Law Policy 2003; 20: 1-24 
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As I have discussed elsewhere4 Kass somewhat undermines his own claim here by invoking divine 
design as the essence of humanity, rather than cognitive development, given that such an appeal 
carries little weight if one does not believe in any god as he does. However, the essence of his 
point is clear. Similarly, and more explicitly, he states that artificial “transformations of human 
nature” will de facto prevent the subject from being human.5  
 
Nicholas Agar (who agrees with Kass perhaps more in spirit than in letter) adds some detail, 
making a distinction on the grounds that moderate enhancements “do not exceed the maximum 
attainable [capacity] by any current or past human being”6, giving as examples to “make [children] 
as smart as the genius physicist Albert Einstein, or as good at tennis as the Swiss maestro Roger 
Federer”. This implies therefore that an enhancement which increases ability beyond the bounds 
of extant human achievement would warrant being termed ‘radical’, and Agar qualifies his ‘radical’ 
enhancement by having it “greatly exceed” the extant.  
 
I have queried this particular viewpoint elsewhere7 by offering something of a reductio: we see 
(and celebrate) beings who exceed that which was previously the pinnacle of human achievement 
on a regular basis- every four years or so, for instance, at the Olympic Games. Does the reigning 
100m champion cease to be human upon taking the world record? Does s/he then return to 
human status once surpassed? The same question applies to children born with genius-level 
intelligences (though these are more difficult to measure). The conservative position rests on 
comparative evaluation with a static norm, which does not really exist if it can be constantly 
surpassed to greater and greater degrees. This Boorsian8 biological normality, or ‘species-typical’ 
function is a convenient one, though it is only applicable in biological contexts, and possibly not 
especially useful in discussion of the nature of the posthuman, as we shall see a little later.  
 
Agar goes on to say that because “[r]adically enhanced beings are... significantly “better” than us 
in various ways, they are different from us- so different, in fact, that they do not deserve to be 
called human.”9 This particular idea of ‘deserving’ is one to which I shall return, but it is useful to 
note here that ‘qualify’ may be a more useful term. The gist of Agar’s thought is present elsewhere 
throughout the literature, which generally follows the idea of the ‘posthuman’ as something beyond 
                                                 
4 Lawrence op. cit. 1.  at 265 
5 Flaumenhaft op. cit. 3 
6 N. Agar. Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement. Cambridge, MA,:MIT Press, 2010 p.17. 
7 Lawrence op. cit. 1 
8 The idea was, if not created by, certainly codified by Boorse in his naturalistic account of disease, the Biostatical 
Theory, in C. Boorse. 1997. A Rebuttal on Health. In What is Disease J. M. Humber & R. F. Almeder, eds. Totowa, NJ: 
Humana Press. p. 3–134. 
9 Nick does go on to somewhat qualify his statement and add some subtleties in his later works Truly Human 
Enhancement (N. Agar. Truly human enhancement: A philosophical defense of limits. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2013) 
and his new book The Skeptical Optimist (N. Agar. The Sceptical Optimist: Why technology isnt the answer to 
everything. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015), as well as in personal discussion, though I understand his essential 
position to remain the same. 
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what is presently called human, a separate group.10 This is evident on both ‘sides’ of the 
enhancement debate. Consider, for example, the brief explanation of ‘posthuman’ offered to us by 
noted enhancement advocate and self-described transhumanist Nick Bostrom. He tells us that 
 
[i]t is sometimes useful to talk about possible future beings whose basic capacities so 
radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by 
our current standards. The standard word for such beings is “posthuman”.11 
 
This description is notable for being one of the only points at which an author has deliberately 
stated their assumptions on the term,12 though it is difficult to call it a clear explanation as it suffers 
from a fundamental problem. ‘Human’ is itself a greatly abused term, especially in the context of 
the enhancement/ posthuman debate, and the myriad of meanings ascribed to it could give 
‘posthuman’ a very different slant depending on one’s understanding. For that matter, it has been 
an abused term from what may be the founding debates of modern bioethics, regarding moral 
status and the beginning of life. For instance, many may accept that a blastocyst or early-stage 
embryo would qualify as living genetically Homo sapiens sapiens tissue, but hold that it does not 
yet qualify as human (and thus qualify for protection). Thus it is essential to determine conclusively 
perhaps not a single standard as such, but that it is clear which of the possible meanings we are 
discussing in any given context. What is it that we are talking about going ‘beyond’? 
 
What We Really Mean By ‘Posthuman’ 
 
There are, perhaps, three main senses in which the term ‘human’ is frequently employed- the 
biological, the moral, and the self- (or other-) idealising.13 In the first of these, human is often 
conflated with Homo sapiens sapiens, and used interchangeably with this term to refer to our 
taxonomic species14 (such as the common term ‘human anatomy’15), In the second sense, ‘human’ 
                                                 
10 Amongst many: N. Bostrom. Why I want to be post human when I grow up. In Medical Enhancement and 
Posthumanity. B. Gordijn & R. Chadwick, eds. New York: Springer, 2008 p. 107-137; N. Bostrom. 2003. Transhumanist 
FAQ http://www.nickbostrom.com/views/transhumanist.pdf p5 (last accessed 21 Jan 2016); S. Marsen. Becoming More 
Than Human: Technology and the Post-Human Condition J Evol Technol 2008; 19: 1; A. Buchanan. Moral Status and 
Human Enhancement. Philos Public Aff 2009; 37,4: 364-81; D. DeGrazia, Genetic Enhancement, Post-persons and 
Moral Status: a Reply to Buchanan. J Med Ethics 2012; 38,3: 135–139; A. Buchanan. Still Unconvinced, but Still 
Tentative: a Reply to DeGrazia. J Med Ethics 2012; 38,3: 40–141; N. Agar. Why We Can’t Really Say What Post-
persons Are. J Med Ethics 2012; 38,3: 144–145; J. Wilson. Persons, Post-persons and Thresholds. J Med Ethics 2012; 
38,3: 143–144; D. DeGrazia. Genetic Enhancement, Post-persons, and Moral Status: Author Reply to Commentaries. J 
Med Ethics  2012; 38,3: 145–147.  
11 Bostrom. Transhumanist FAQ Ibid. 
12 Another notable example can be found throughout Chapter 3 of D. Degrazia. Creation Ethics: Reproduction, Genetics, 
and Quality of Life. New York: Oxford Unversity Press 2012. p. 60-96 
13 I would note here that in using ‘idealising’ I do not commit myself to a particular philosophical account of intent, but 
rather more simply I use the term within the bounds of its normal English deployment. It may be also be understood as 
“self-defining” or “self-developmental”. 
14 Though there is a strong argument to be made that it is frequently used more broadly in academic discussion to refer 
to our genus. This is a topic which deserves exploration, but for which sadly there is insufficient space here. See, for 
instance, the widespread discussion regarding great ape personhood and the validity of making such beings subject to 
human rights law.  
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(or, to be accurate, ‘humanity’) generally refers to a community of beings which qualify as having a 
certain moral value or status; and the third, the self-idealising sense, is more descriptive- a label 
denoting the collection of qualities that make us who we are- or who we would like to be- as 
beings, or, to be pithy, ‘what matters about those who matter’.16 Critics of this breakdown might 
query the extent to which the third and second senses overlap, and the answer is only to the 
extent that the self-ideal is, itself, morally idealizing. Asking myself a question as to what I would 
like to see myself as, and then answering it, does not necessarily give an answer of any moral 
value- if I were to tell myself that my self-ideal is to be a good sportsman, this is likely to be morally 
neutral. On the other hand, Idealizing being ‘a good person’ is likely to be much more morally 
directed. Similarly, to be in favour of enhancement is to be morally motivated- to quote Harris, “If it 
wasn’t good for you, it wouldn’t be enhancement.”17 
 
Considering the prevailing wisdom as espoused by Bostrom- that the posthuman is in some way 
‘beyond’- we could thus conclude that one might be a novel species or genus of hominid, naturally 
possessed of capabilities similar in nature to but surpassing in performance those widely 
considered species-typical for Homo sapiens. Or, perhaps we infer that the term indicates a 
morally more valuable being than a regular human, a post-person to our person? There’s a third 
option: that a posthuman is a being which embodies our self-ideal more successfully than we do 
ourselves- one “more human than human”. Which to choose? Or, is it even necessary to do so? 
 
First Sense- Biological 
 
Hayles suggested that “the humanities have always been concerned with shifting definitions of the 
human”18, and so too is the biological form of Homo sapiens- our first sense of ‘human’- far from a 
constant. Hayles was concerned with a slightly different usage of ‘posthuman’- in her case, the 
idea of a mode of critical discourse rather than an actual potential being- but the notion of shifting 
definitions rings true for biology also. For instance, an oft-discussed and highly visible change is in 
average heights of populations over time. To refer back to an earlier point, the so-called Irish 
Giant, Charles Byrne, whose skeleton is housed in the Hunterian museum19 may have been 
unusually tall at (at least) seven foot seven- perhaps taller than any other sapiens of the time, but 
this does not and did not make him something other than human.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 This term even makes it onto the cover of one edition of the revered Gray’s: H. Gray. Anatomy of the Human Body. 
20th Ed. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1918 
16 I am indebted to Sarah Chan for putting into words that which I could not, and for commentary on an early draft. 
17 J. Harris. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 
2010. p. 9  
18 Quoted in D. Solomon. 2007. Interview with N. Katherine Hayles: Preparing the Humanities for the Post Human. 
National Humanities Center. Durham, NC. Collections http://asc.nhc.trp.nc.us/news/?page_id=81. (last accessed 21 Feb 
16) 
19 Royal College of Surgeons.  2015. Collections. London, UK. https://www.rcseng.ac.uk/museums/hunterian/about-
us/collections.html (last accessed 21 Feb 16) 
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A simple literature search reveals hundreds of studies in anthropometric history, with many 
epidemiological and socio-economic correlates having been established, to the point where mean 
height is now utilised as an indicator for nutrition quality and general wellbeing.20 Underlying all of 
these studies is measurable and definite change in height in whichever population is being 
examined. Similar fluctuations can be found in studies of weight (or more pertinently, mass)21, and 
any other varietal one might choose to scrutinise. It would appear, then, that our collective ‘human’ 
physical anatomy is in constant flux, and we know that our biological form does not lend us 
inherent value. Homo sapiens' biomechanical format- with cranium uppermost, opposable thumbs, 
bipedal, plantigrade ambulation, and particular musculoskeletal layout- is far from unique. All of 
these factors can be found in other animals, either separately or even all together in our simian 
genetic relatives. If our posthumans are taxonomically distinct from humans, then it follows that 
they would feature some degree of taxonomic difference, whatever the means of speciation that 
may result in their existence. Whilst this is eminently possible- despite the general blueprint being 
the same, we are a distinct species from Pan troglodytes- it is unlikely to be the case here. 
 
To suggest that we today are not beyond in ‘species-typical capacity’ the 195,000 year old Homo 
sapiens sapiens fossils known as Omo I and Omo II22 is ludicrous. Yet we afford them human 
status in (both academic and casual) discussion23, and in a strict Biological Species Concept24 
(BSC) understanding of biological species- this being the most commonly accepted- Omo and 
modern man are one and the same since we are not reproductively isolated. Indeed we afford the 
term ‘archaic humans’ to distinct species such as Homo neanderthalensis (with whom H. Sapiens 
is known to have interbred, muddying the waters of reproductive speciation within the hominina 
subtribe25 and perhaps inclining us more towards a pragmatic view of species), Homo 
rhodesiensis, and Homo heidelbergensis.26 We do not generally consider ourselves to be 
‘posthuman’, and yet compared to our human ancestors, we are significantly different. It may be 
worth considering, too, that modern science and technological methods such as in vitro fertilisation 
and other assisted reproductive technologies may vastly increase the ambit of what ‘reproductive 
isolation’ and thus ‘biological species’ might mean.27 The biological sense of ‘posthuman’, then, is 
unhelpful.  
                                                 
20 e.g.: P. Dasgupta. An Enquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995; R.H. Steckel. 
Stature and the Standard of Living. J Econ Lit 1995; 33,4: 1903-40. 
21 K.M. Flegal et al. Overweight and obesity in the United States: prevalence and trends, 1960-1994. Int J Obes Relat 
Metab Disord 1998; 22,1: 39-47. 
22 J. G. Fleagle et al. Paleoanthropology of the Kibish Formation, southern Ethiopia: Introduction. J Hum Evol 2008; 55,3: 
360–365; I. Mcdougall. Stratigraphic placement and age of modern humans from Kibish, Ethiopia. Nature 2005 
433,7027: 733–736. 
23 For instance, Mcdougall, ibid. 
24 E. Mayr. Systematics and the origin of species from the viewpoint of a zoologist. New York: Columbia University Press; 
1942.  
25 Subtribe being the lesser taxonomic division between subfamily and genus, and which in this case includes Homo and 
related australopithecines after the cladogenic split from Pan. 
26 R. Dawkins. Archaic homo sapiens. In The Ancestor's Tale. Boston: Mariner; 2005 
27 As Harris has pointed out at some length. J. Harris. Wonderwoman and Superman  Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
2010:143 ff. 
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 Second Sense- Moral Value 
 
It is possible to reflect on the transitions from hominid to human and what this may say about the 
perceived possibility to transition further than this point, but it is important to note that our 
‘humanity’ is a self-assigned classification, with boundaries that have changed and moved along 
with our development.  
 
Historically, Frankfurt28 and Piaget29 both hold that the human sets himself apart through his 
cognitive (and self-determinative) ability, and this idea may link to those of ‘moral community’30 and 
non-finite personhood31. Echoing Harris’ earlier work32 in conceptualising personhood, Steve Fuller 
posits that "perhaps membership in Homo sapiens is neither sufficient nor even necessary to 
qualify a being as human”33, and uses the analogy of the republic. Being born into the republic 
confers no benefit over earning citizenship in some other fashion. The heritable quality is 
irrelevant- and this applies to 'human citizenship’, or the human community, also. One either is, or 
is not, a citizen; it is a threshold concept. One cannot feasibly be a citizen to a greater degree than 
anyone else.34 Equally, once a being passes the moral status threshold for the human community, 
it must count as human. Following this logic, humanity is a “matter of sufficiency”35- an end-state 
for moral status, not a stepping-stone which one can be ‘post’.  
 
Fuller does fall into the trap here of failing to explain his terms. He appears to mean ‘human, where 
human is being used as a political moral category’ but this may have made for an ungainly bon 
mot. His analogy, too, lacks an important subtlety. In the later Roman Empire, I as a Briton may 
well have qualified to hold Roman citizenship36- but this is not to say I would be treated as would a 
Roman by other Romans, which may be equally or even more important than the citizen label. As 
he states earlier in the same piece: 
 
[F]or most of what is properly called 'human history' (i.e., the history that starts with the 
invention of writing), most of Homo sapiens have not qualified as 'human'—and not simply 
                                                 
28 H. Frankfurt. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person J Philos 1971; 68: 5-7.  
29 see, for example: 
J. Piaget. La construction du réel chez l'enfant   /  The construction of reality in the child. New York, Basic Books 
1937/1954; and J. Piaget.  La causalité chez l’enfant. Br J Psychol 1928; 18: 276-301. 
30 L.E. Lomasky. Persons, rights, and the moral community. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1987. 
31 J. Overboe. Ableist Limits on Self-Narration: The Concept of Post-personhood. In Unfitting Stories: Narrative 
Approaches to Disease, Disability, and Trauma. V. Raoul, ed. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press; 
 2007: 175-182. 
32 J. Harris. The Value of Life. London, Routledge; 1985 
33 S. Fuller. 2014. What scientific idea is ready for retirement? Steve Fuller: Human Being= Homo Sapiens edge.org 
http://edge.org/response-detail/25396 (Last accessed 25 Feb 16) 
34 Though I acknowledge that in certain historical republics the theoretical benefit of this was less than obvious in 
practice. 
35 A. Buchanan. Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011; p. 
224 
36 I thank Margot Brazier for this criticism in particular. 
  8 
because they were too young or too disabled. In sociology, we routinely invoke a trinity of 
shame—'race, class, and gender'—to characterise the gap that remains between the 
normal existence of Homo sapiens and the normative ideal of full humanity.37 
 
It may be, here, that it is more helpful to understand ‘have not qualified’ as ‘have not been 
regarded as qualifying’.  
 
With this in mind, we might return to Agar’s contention that “[r]adically enhanced beings are... 
significantly better than us in various ways, they are different from us- so different, in fact, that they 
do not deserve to be called human.” In the sense of the concept of the human- the moral- 
community, it seems difficult to accept that Agar can be correct. The only means by which a being 
might “not deserve to be called human” would be for them to fail to reach the moral value threshold 
of the human community. If Agar is correct, then there is a danger of finding oneself stuck with an 
unpalatable conclusion born from the corollary of his point: that a being who somehow becomes 
significantly ‘worse’38 (or rather, less capable) than other humans would also “not deserve to be 
called human”.39 One way to conceptualise this is to consider the antonym of what we are calling 
‘second-sense “human”’, which might roughly be ‘dehumanised’- something historically done to 
ostracize peoples before enacting genocide against them, so to speak, guilt free- for instance 
Jewish peoples labelled ‘rats’ or Untermenschen during the Holocaust.40 
 
Perhaps, then, the idea of a being no longer deserving membership of the human community is too 
problematic. It might be better stated as failing to qualify. We have an instinctive reaction against 
the idea applying this judgment to a member of Homo sapiens, even one of very limited cognitive 
capacity. Philosophically, however, we would have to admit that such a being may not deserve to 
be called ‘person’. It may be that the “human community” and the community of persons are not 
necessarily one and the same, and there is a political factor in play.  
 
We have to recognize that someone who might fail the moral value threshold of personhood would 
still be included within our biological species, especially given the incoherence of ‘species-typical 
capacity’ in this context. Per Mayr41, because someone suffering a hypothetical disability that 
prevents sexual reproduction would be able, at least but for that disability, to reproduce with 
another human, they satisfy the Biological Species Concept. Throughout his work on 
enhancement, Agar generally uses the BSC to define the limits of prudential interest42- as in, we 
                                                 
37 Fuller, op cit 33. 
38 I use the term here as an antonym of Agar’s “better”, rather than as any reflection of my own opinions. 
39 Thanks to John Harris for pointing this out in discussion. 
40 Of course I am certain that Nick would never wish to imply such a thing; but it cannot be ignored as potentially being 
the other side of his argument here. 
41 Mayr. Op cit 24. 
42 Agar. op cit 6: throughout. Also N. Agar. Thoughts about our species’ future: themes from Humanity’s End: Why We 
Should Reject Radical Enhancement. J Evol Technol 2010; 1,21: 23-31. 
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have an interest in those we would be able to reproduce with. Possessing this interest in one group 
over another does not equate to speciesm- although it is a form of relativism, it is not perjorative, 
implying that those we cannot reproduce with have a lesser or different moral status.  If so, it 
follows that it is nonsensical to force-apply a moral significance to species at all in terms of our 
second, communitarian sense of ‘posthuman’. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that we would 
not have a prudential interest in beings we bring to fruition, by whatever means.  
 
This leaves us, then, with the third potential sense of ‘posthuman’, which as mentioned stems from 
the use of ‘human’ to denote a desirable set of characteristics, qualities, and ideals that we hold 
about ourselves (or our moral community) as a whole.  
 
 Third Sense- Self-ideal 
 
The entire history of humanity (in any sense) has been geared towards realizing these traits and 
ideals, generally practiced by means of enhancement. Homo sapiens could never have evolved 
successfully without the prior work of ancestor species to enhance their own capacities. 
Paleoanthropological literature suggests in particular that the development of tool use for hunting 
was critical in being able to provide sufficient energy to fuel larger and larger brains.43 It follows 
that an increased drain on the body’s energy budget by a larger brain (with a greater capacity for 
work) requires a proportionately increased calorific intake, and gaining the ability to hunt animals 
for energy-rich meat would provide for this. The discovery of means to control fire by at least 
Homo erectus44 (if not even earlier ancestors45) also acted to improve nutrition through increasing 
the digestibility of foods through cooking46. It also contributed47 to such physiological factors which 
we use to define Homo sapiens such as smaller jaws and teeth than ancestor species48. Less 
directly, fire’s provision of warmth and light was vital for the survival of hairless ancestor species, 
driving off predators and making up for a lack of inherent ability to retain heat.49 
 
There is a rich tradition in both academic and fictional literature of creating alternative Latinate 
names for our species. Many of these reflect facets of third- sense ‘humanity’; including Homo 
socius- man as a social being50, Homo faber- fabricating man51 or in an alternate sense “man as 
                                                 
43 A. Gibbons. Solving the Brain's Energy Crisis. Science 1998 280,5368: 1345–47. 
44 S.R. James. Hominid Use of Fire in the Lower and Middle Pleistocene: A Review of the Evidence. Curr Anthropol 1989 
30,1: 1–26. 
45 Ibid. 
46 R. Wrangham & N. Conklin-Brittain. Cooking as a biological trait. Comp Biochem Physiol a Mol Integr Physiol 2003 
136,1: 35–46. 
47 J. Pickrell. Human 'dental chaos' linked to evolution of cooking. New Scientist online, 19/02/05 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn7035-human-dental-chaos-linked-to-evolution-of-cooking.html#.U8WJSY1dUah 
(last accessed 25 Feb 2016) 
48 R. Boyd. & J. Silk. How Humans Evolved. New York: Norton & Company 2003 
49 D. Price. Energy and Human Evolution. Popul Environ 1995; 16,4: 301-19  
50 P. Berger. & T. Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge New York: 
Random House 1966 
51 H. Arendt. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958 
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the artifex of his destiny”52, and Homo ludens- playful man.53 In this manner, Homo sapiens 
similarly only encapsulates one aspect of our being, wise man (or alternately knowing man, which 
could be argued to describe another aspect of our nature). It isn’t entirely clear why Linnaeus54 
chose to highlight this element of humanity with the chosen specific epithet,55 though it is 
interesting to note that he himself termed it (and other descriptive elements of the bionomial 
system) a ‘trivial name’.  
 
Yves Gingras would have us named Homo technologicus, or technological man. Given that we are 
also Homo faber, we necessarily create our own world through our own perceptions and means- 
techniques- of reason and interpretation. Gingras holds that therefore everything around us is, and 
we ourselves are, artificial, a product of technology, that man is necessarily counter-nature.56  This 
may or may not be true, but the idea of our being a product of technology is vitally important. 
Returning to an earlier point, I would suggest that given Homo sapiens only having arisen through 
being enhanced by technologies such as fire and tool use, we might be better termed Homo 
augmentus- ‘elevated man’ or ‘augmented man’. Gingras is correct in one regard, at least- we are 
able to possess the faculties we do as a species as a result of primitive technologies. However, it 
is important to be clear that we are elevated by the technology, not that we are ourselves 
technological creations. 
 
If striving to uphold the elements of third-sense humanity is what makes us who we are, then a 
being “…significantly better than us…”57 presumably must be able to uphold or realize these ideals 
to a greater degree than to which we are presently able. If it is these ideals that make us human, 
then upholding them more successfully- whether through technology or otherwise- must perforce 
make one more successful at being human. Note that this is not the same thing as being other 
than human, or beyond human. 
 
How, then, can radical enhancement lead to something beyond humanity- would more 
enhancement not perhaps mean that we become fundamentally more human?  
 
Taxonomy, Persons, and Continuity 
 
                                                 
52 F. Stoessl. Die Sententiae des Appius Claudius Caecus. Rh Mus 1979;122:18–23.  
53 J. Huizinga. Homo ludens; a study of the play-element in culture. Boston: Beacon Press 1955 
54 C. von Linné, (1758). Systema naturæ. Regnum animale. (10 ed.). pp. 18, 20. Available from: 
http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/80764#page/28/mode/1up (last accessed 25 Feb 16) 
55 Plato’s taxonomical designation for our species- “featherless biped”- is possibly more literal. However, upon his 
proclaiming this, Diogenes swiftly presented him with a plucked chicken, so perhaps we can understand Linnaeus’ 
whimsy on this point. Laertius D. The lives and opinions of eminent philosophers. London: HG Bohn; 1853. 
 6.40 
56 Y. Gingras. Éloge de l'homo techno-logicus. Saint-Laurent, Québec: Les Editions Fides 2005 p12.  
57 Agar op cit. 6 
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As noted, taxonomic classification does not itself lend any value to a given being. Linnaeus giving 
us the binomial of H. sapiens is simply a product of the system he developed for categorising 
animals. It is co-incidental that a literal translation of the Latin can be interpreted as describing 
something we consider to be inherent about us- had the system existed before our evolution, we 
could just as easily have been named after our discoverer or a beloved media personality,58 as are 
many creatures today.  
 
Consequently, to be beyond H. sapiens sapiens- H. sapiens superior, if you will59 - is also 
meaningless in these terms. While we are far from the only species in a state of change- indeed 
every species is constantly subject to genetic drift and natural selection, however slow- it is still 
convenient to be able to label beings into categories. This is perhaps not the place to attempt to 
solve the so-called ‘species problem’, but the above does strongly lend itself to the pragmatist 
viewpoint60 that species is conceptually convenient and practical, and therefore conceptually real; 
despite probably failing to qualify as a natural kind. If so, the biological sense of human is 
significantly weakened when comparing ‘human’ and ‘posthuman’. 
 
Obsession with forcing a distinction between human and posthuman is not particularly interesting, 
in and of itself, as it is clear that there is none meaningful to be drawn; but the idea of post-persons 
is a slightly different prospect, and is more at the heart of the true debate than the existing 
academic dialogue probably makes clear. Whilst it is likely true61 that some of our Homina 
ancestors were human pre-persons, assuming personhood is a threshold concept, the very fact of 
this would preclude there from being Homo post-persons since the threshold would already be 
surpassed. Rather than fear the conceptually troublesome, perhaps what we ought worry about is 
being depersonalized and not being de- or trans- or post-humanized. To have enhanced moral 
awareness, enhanced consciousness, etcetera is not an inherently bad thing- in fact, to possess 
these is simply to more fully realize characteristics that are part of the wider, for want of a better 
term, zeitgeist of the self-ideal. This is presumably not an outcome we should be worrying about, 
but rather one to be embraced. 
 
                                                 
58  For instance, Materpiscis attenboroughi, Agra schwarzeneggeri, or the somewhat forced ‘Spider from Mars’ 
Heteropoda davidbowie. 
59  I admit that thanks are probably due here to Stan Lee and the many other writers of Marvel’s X-Men, as well as 
innumerable other science-fiction sources, but X-Men is where I first became familiar with the term. See, for instance, S. 
Lobdell. The Story Of The Year! Uncanny X-Men #346 (Marvel Comics)1997 1:346; G. Morrison. Superdestroyer. New 
X-Men #124 (Marvel Comics) 2002; 1:124; F. Tieri. Man and Monster: Conclusion Weapon X #28 (Marvel Comics) 2004 
2:28. 
Other potential names proffered by Marvel include H. mutandis- ‘Changed Man’ (W. Ellis. Agent X-13's report on the 
emergency annexation of Earth-616 Astonishing X-Men: Ghost Boxes #1 (Marvel Comics) 2008; 1:1; and H. mutantur- 
‘Changed Ones’ (N. Gaiman. 1602 Part One; In Which We are Introduced to Some of Our Featured Players. Marvel 
1602 #1 (Marvel Comics) 2003;1:1. 
60 J. Dupré. In defence of classification. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2001; 32: 203–219. 
61 Depending on their natures. This is a question which merits much deeper discussion, and though there is regrettably 
not space in this paper it will be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
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What this shows is that it is a mistake to envisage the posthuman as a different species. It is a 
mistake to imagine traits such as immortality or godlike powers as being changes that indicate a 
significant discontinuity. This is not to say that they could not change us at all. It seems likely that 
an immortal (though importantly not invulnerable) person would have an enduring and open-ended 
investment in the future. This may not necessarily be embodied simply in benevolent interest in 
their successors but rather a more personal, and not simply intellectual and transient, interest in 
the future that a more markedly mortal being could not possess.62 However it is entirely possible to 
possess continuity for some purposes and not for others. Therefore, the argument really is 
whether or not the acquisition of such traits represents a genuine transition in status, and whether 
what frightens conservative commentators is really the notion of this transition being premature or 
presumptuous for our species. 
 
To such commentators, it seems to be comfortable to consider ‘humans’ as a finished product, that 
transformation is inimical to our essence as such. Darwinian, naturally occurring evolution appears 
to have slowed due to our technological elevation from a world of kill-or-be-killed. It may be 
comforting to imagine that this means it has stopped outright, though of course this is merely a 
function of our own limited perceptions and it continues at the same glacially slow pace as it ever 
has. Psychologically, we generally find clear division useful and pleasing, discrete categorization 
almost soothing. Perhaps this goes some distance to explain the above mindset.  
 
There is certainly far more that might be said on this matter, though for the moment it is enough to 
acknowledge that people are perhaps afraid of the idea of further evolution because we 
(understandably!) dislike the idea of having further self-development to undertake. Once we finally 
reach adulthood, that is supposed to be the end of the road, the final stage. We see this reflected 
in literature- Tolstoy’s trilogy of Childhood, Boyhood, and Youth63 separates out the milestones on 
the way to this point; Shakespeare’s famous ‘Seven Ages of Man’ monologue from As You Like It64 
divides a lifetime into the Acts of a play. 
 
An Inclusive Terminology 
 
Yet, if we must picture the posthuman as anything separate from ‘us’ in some way, if it is 
absolutely necessary to differentiate, perhaps it is this vision that is the most useful: an ‘Eighth Age 
of Man’, not quite the same and yet not different enough to be called ‘other’. As I have discussed, 
the touted ‘posthuman’ probably fails to satisfy any of the conditions to be categorized as either 
biologically or morally separate from ‘humans’. However, it would be somewhat parochial to try 
                                                 
62 Thanks to John Harris for reminding me of this important point. Harris has considered this issue in several places, 
notably Harris. Enhancing Evolution Ch. 3 
63 L. Tolstoy. Translation N. H. Dole. The Complete Works: Childhood, Boyhood and Youth. USA: TY Crowell; 1899. 
64 W. Shakespeare. As You Like It. In R. Proudfoot, A. Thompson & D.S. Kastan, eds. The Arden Shakespeare. Thomas 
Walton-on-Thames: Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1998. Act 2 Scene VII 
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and argue that it isn’t useful to have a term we can use when discussing these potential beings. 
Whilst I do not accept that the theoretical period in which some people possess new abilities or 
traits and others don’t will necessarily create a societal divide65 (or, at least, I see no good reason 
why this is unavoidable); I concede that just as it is sometimes necessary to terminologically 
distinguish between races using anthropometric taxons such as Negroid, Mongoloid, or 
Caucasoid, there may well be some practical application in having one for the beings we may 
become. ‘Posthuman’, as I hope to have demonstrated, is perhaps not this term. Instead, I might 
tentatively suggest an alternative which approaches what I consider to be the core of the matter.  
 
The point I have laboured herein is that there is no clean divide between today’s Homo sapiens 
and tomorrow’s potentially more capable Homo sapiens. The fact that we cannot distinguish this 
division is telling. It is difficult to accurately describe something as –post, as coming after, when it 
does nothing of the sort. Earlier in this paper I noted that the etymology of our English ‘–post’ 
comes from the Latin, and so it seems fitting to return to the classical languages for a more useful 
label. The Greek prefix ‘meta-’,66 originally, could be translated similarly to ‘–post’ in suggesting 
‘after’, but it also could mean ‘beside’, ‘with’, or ‘among’, depending on context and grammar.67 A 
‘metahuman’, then, might be a being beyond (or ‘post-’) us in terms of some capacity or another, 
but alongside us, amongst us, in as much as it is in all senses that matter no different to the 
‘humans’ we consider ourselves to be. There will never come a point where we look at ourselves 
and exclaim, “We are now posthuman!”- rather, consider the disabled person. We do not hold that 
they should be treated differently- or, at least, we know that they ought not to be. This is no 
different from the IVF child. We do not consider them to be different in any way that matters, 
although it is occasionally useful to group people who are subject to some quirk of biology or fate 
together. So it is with the metahuman.  
 
However, I acknowledge that this proposal may too run afoul of the so-called ‘expressibility 
problem’. In this instance, the mere act of assigning terminology is inherently one of division. Even 
in the case of the previously mentioned useful anthropometric taxons, the use of these terms is 
designed to classify and separate. As I hope to have shown, this is precisely the problem with the 
notional posthuman. My own thoughts and terminologies, as well as those of various learned 
colleagues, seem to suffer this issue- it is difficult to conceive of a term which does not separate or 
‘other’ in this fashion.  
 
                                                 
65 As claimed by, for example, K. Warwick. I, Cyborg. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004. 
66 as opposed to the epistemological usage in which it means ‘about (something’s own category)’. 
67 μετά, H. G. Liddell & R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, on Perseus Digital Library.  
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Alternate terms68 we might consider using include the ‘Promethean Man’, or the ‘Enhanced 
Human’- both terms which when considered in the context of this paper may suffice well (being as 
they are more accurate descriptions than ‘posthuman’), but which in practical usage would likely 
serve to partition by the very act of specifying. The simplicity of ‘Enhanced Human’ may make it 
the superior term in as much as it specifies the being in question as being human, but it carries the 
unwanted implication that being enhanced is a quality necessarily worth flagging- that it is a quality 
which in some way alters one’s value.  
 
Perhaps, ultimately, it is not vital to the debate to develop a terminology which solves this; though I 
would be interested to see one. Instead it would be more valuable, throughout the wider academic 
dialogue on the topic, to acknowledge and seek to avoid invoking the misapprehensions discussed 
here about humanity and value. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The commentators on both sides of the debate, concerning the meaning of ‘posthuman’ do so as if 
it had currency. It is deployed as though this term had either determinate meaning or as if it 
marked some indeterminate point (which could then be debated) at which humans transition to 
something else, something new. To use the term to imply species or value change, or a radical 
transition (the meaning of which is unclear in any case), there needs to be justification in a way 
which does not seem to have been delivered within the existing dialogue. Here, I have argued that 
this is not a plausible understanding, and furthermore that it is based in error- the analogous 
changes we have undergone throughout our history have not been thought to signal a qualitative 
change, or at least, not to any significant degree. We are, today, post-internet age humans; we are 
post-neolithic, post-bronze age, post-iron age. These transitions have not changed our value or 
the nature of our being- machine-age man, Homo augmentus, is still man. The touted ‘posthuman’ 
is, in general, overhyped and unwarranted by the evidence- either factual, or conceptual- and does 
not seem to have been subject to a close analysis until now. Perhaps commentators are aware of 
this failing and yet choose to avoid remedying it in order to preserve the utility of a concept so 
vague and all-encompassing, or for fear of undermining their arguments in some cases as 
explored herein. The ‘posthuman’ as the beyond is incoherent and obfuscatory at best, and it is 
important that we do not lose sight of the fact that species does not dictate moral value. The key is 
to ask not what we may become, but rather: why does it matter? 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 These names courtesy of John Harris, who, despite his erudition, accepts that he “potentially failed” my challenge to 
avoid the trap at hand. 
